Xi Jinping: People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force generals vanish amid China purge

Now, even his own appointees to China’s most sensitive force – the nuclear Rocket Force – have fallen foul of a new purge.

The two leading generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force were abruptly replaced this week. And while their successors have been announced, no explanation has been given for the surprise move.

The mysterious disappearance of Xi’s hand-picked foreign minister Qin Gang last month started tongues wagging about the health of internal Communist Party politics.

Expelled Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao and his deputy, Liu Guangbin, were also “captain’s picks”. Li is the third commander of the unit since it was separated from the rest of the PLA’s command structure by Xi in 2015. And he was promoted to the Communist Party’s 205-member Central Committee in October.

Now he, Liu and former deputy Zhang Zhenzhong have “vanished” amid a swirl of corruption and espionage rumours.

Central to the claims is the extent of detail on the Rocket Force’s facilities and operations contained within a 255-page report released by the US military’s Air University China Aerospace Department.

Its hi-tech cruise and ballistic missiles are a critical military asset for Beijing. New hypersonic glide vehicles with conventional warheads are designed to overcome the defences of US aircraft carriers and bases. And the rapid construction of missile silos in the Xinjiang desert reflects a growing emphasis on nuclear deterrence.

“The purge of People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) leadership indicates that Xi Jinping needs to re-establish confidence in portions of the military leadership,” noted the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

And it adds their replacements – who appear to have little experience with strategic missiles – bring with them a whole set of new questions.

Trouble in paradise

“The purge reflects another crackdown by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to assert control over its leadership,” argued the ISW.

“Opaque as the details are, the move offers a glimmer of insight into the recurring problem of military corruption.”

The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, controlled by Beijing under new national security laws, cites two anonymous sources saying the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) anti-graft Commission for Discipline Inspection was behind the move.

“Almost all the senior generals [in the rocket force] had good reputations before their promotion. They became immoral after moving to Beijing headquarters, allowing them to have more chances to engage with defence-related enterprises,” one anonymous source reportedly said.

The generals were apparently stood down in June after investigations commenced in March.

That was when the Rocket Force’s former first commander, Wei Fenghe, retired as China’s defence minister.

“His appointment in 2018 was seen by many as a sign of Xi’s support for the force,” the Post stated.

But corruption charges have a history of selective application under Xi’s leadership. Their use is often associated with a political purge.

They can also be a mask for a more severe crisis.

The Financial Times cites an unnamed government official claiming the trigger for the purge was a growing suspicion that the PLARF leadership was behind the leaking of sensitive strategic information to foreign governments.

A commentary in Radio Free Asia by political commentator Chen Pokong said a cloud has fallen over a total of six current and former PLARF commanders. And the extent of detail leaked about the unit “shows the entire leadership of the Rocket Army has betrayed Xi Jinping”.

Loyalty trumps competence

Wang Houbin is the former deputy commander of the PLA navy. He now takes command of the force. His deputy will be Xu Xisheng, a political commissar previously assigned to the air force.

Neither have any experience within the Rocket Force.

Some analysts suggest their choice represents a move to reposition the Rocket Force into a “Nuclear Triad” similar to that of the United States. Here, the air force, army and navy each maintain and control their own nuclear arsenals under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States.

But such a significant restructuring would involve more than simply replacing those at the top. It also would be unusual so soon after Xi’s high-profile creation of the Rocket Force in 2015.

“Xi stated in late July that he aimed to strengthen military governance by ensuring party control over the military, indicating he thinks that the PLA is still not sufficiently ideologically loyal to the party,” the ISW noted.

“The choice to promote from outside of the PLARF indicates that Xi lacks confidence in the lower echelon of PLARF general officers, who could have internal patronage networks pertaining to the past leadership.”

Both new generals are also Chinese Communist Party commissars – loyalists responsible for enforcing party ideology and discipline.

Xu is also a full member of the Party’s Central Committee.

Chairman Xi has, in recent months, renewed public demands for “absolute loyalty” from his military.

In July, the Communist Party’s PLA Daily news service asserted Chairman Xi considered it a personal mission “to resolve significant issues and all sorts of problems and chaos in the military”.

Loyalty, however, is potentially a problem that extends throughout the PLA. The 100 or more generals that have fallen to Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns over the past decade will have established broad networks to support their position. And these associates likely remain unhappy.

“This purge demonstrates to a new generation of PLA general officers that anti-corruption is still a top priority for Xi and an active tool to ensure their loyalty to the party,” the ISW concluded.

Jamie Seidel is a freelance writer | @JamieSeidel